Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation policy mixes for sustainability transitions by Kivimaa, Paula & Kern, Florian
Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation policy 
mixes for sustainability transitions
Article  (Published Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Kivimaa, Paula and Kern, Florian (2016) Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation 
policy mixes for sustainability transitions. Research Policy, 45 (1). pp. 205-217. ISSN 0048-7333 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/57315/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Research Policy 45 (2016) 205–217
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Research  Policy
jo ur nal ho me  page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / respol
Creative  destruction  or  mere  niche  support?  Innovation  policy  mixes
for  sustainability  transitions
Paula  Kivimaa a,b,∗, Florian Kern a
a SPRU-Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK
b Finnish Environment Institute, P.O. Box 140, Fi-00251 Helsinki, Finland
a  r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n f  o
Article history:
Received 3 October 2014
Received in revised form 16 July 2015
Accepted 27 September 2015
Keywords:
Innovation policy
Policy mix
Sustainability transitions
Energy efficiency
Motors of innovation
Technological innovation system (TIS)
a  b  s  t  r a  c t
Recently,  there  has  been  an increasing interest  in policy mixes  in innovation  studies. While it  has  long
been  acknowledged that  the  stimulation of innovation and  technological  change  involves  different  types
of policy instruments,  how such  instruments form  policy mixes  has only recently  become  of  interest.
We  argue that an area  in which  policy  mixes  are  particularly  important is  the  field of sustainability
transitions.  Transitions  imply not only  the  development  of disruptive  innovations  but  also  of  policies
aiming  for  wider change  in socio-technical systems.  We  propose that  ideally  policy  mixes for  transitions
include  elements  of ‘creative  destruction’,  involving  both  policies  aiming  for the  ‘creation’  of new and  for
‘destabilising’ the  old.  We develop  a novel analytical framework including the  two  policy mix  dimensions
(‘creation’  and  ‘destruction’)  by  broadening  the  technological innovation  system functions  approach,  and
specifically by  expanding the  concept  of ‘motors  of  innovation’  to  ‘motors of creative  destruction’.  We test
this  framework by analysing  ‘low  energy’  policy  mixes  in  Finland  and the  UK.  We  find  that  both  countries
have  diverse policy  mixes  to support  energy efficiency  and  reduce  energy  demand  with  instruments  to
cover  all  functions on the  creation side. Despite  the demonstrated  need for such  policies,  unsurprisingly,
destabilising  functions are  addressed  by  fewer  policies,  but there are  empirical examples of such  policies
in both  countries.  The concept of ‘motors  of creative destruction’  is  introduced  to expand  innovation  and
technology  policy  debates  to  go beyond  policy mixes  consisting  of technology push and  demand  pull
instruments,  and to  consider a wider range of policy  instruments  combined  in a  suitable  mix  which  may
contribute  to sustainability  transitions.
©  2015 The Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Recently, there has been increasing interest in  the innovation
studies literature in  questions surrounding policy mixes. While it
has long been acknowledged that the stimulation of innovation and
technological change can include a  number of different types of pol-
icy instruments and that the most appropriate type of instrument
might depend on the stage of the innovation process or the respec-
tive sector (Pavitt, 1984), the issue of how such instruments form
policy mixes has only recently been highlighted as being of interest
to  this community (Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist, 2013;
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Magro and Wilson, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) as well as policy makers
from the European Commission (Nauwelaers et al., 2009).
We argue that policy mixes are particularly important in the
field of sustainability transitions. This literature has received
increasing interest in the context of technology and innovation
studies and goes beyond single innovations, examining change at
the level of socio-technical systems (cf. Markard et al., 2012). Tran-
sitions in  the form of systemic changes in current structures for
consumption and production are viewed as being of paramount
importance to reduce the overall environmental impacts of human
activities. Much of the literature focusses either on protective niche
spaces for innovations which might overturn incumbent regimes
(Smith and Raven, 2012)  or on facilitating the emergence of tech-
nological innovation systems (e.g. Bergek et al., 2008). Recently,
attention has also been paid to the processes of destabilising incum-
bent regimes through “weakening reproduction of core regime
elements” that are seen as necessary to  create “windows of oppor-
tunity” for the upscaling of niche innovations (Turnheim and
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.008
0048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC  BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Geels, 2012, 2013). In this context, major policy change has been
argued to be important, because “it  shapes both the direct sup-
port for industries. . . and economic frame conditions” (Turnheim
and Geels, 2012, p. 46). Thus, transitions may  not only require the
development of disruptive innovations but also of disruptive pol-
icy mixes aiming for systemic change (e.g. Kivimaa and Virkamäki,
2014; Weber and Rohracher, 2012).  This type of policy change is
often, however, constrained by  the political challenges of introduc-
ing more coherent policy mixes (Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Kern
and Howlett, 2009).
Building on the seminal concept of creative destruction, pro-
posed by Joseph Schumpeter, and the recent concept of regime
destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012), we propose that pol-
icy mixes favourable to sustainability transitions need  to  involve
both policies aiming for the ‘creation’ of new and for ‘destroying’
(or withdrawing support for) the old. By making this distinction
we want to ease the identification of elements potentially lacking in
existing policy mixes from the perspective of transitions. Moreover,
the urgency of sustainability transitions requires explicit analyses
of active destabilisation, because solely relying on the emergence
and growth of a  variety of alternatives to  replace incumbent sys-
tems will be too slow. We conceive of these kinds of policy mixes
as not only comprising typical innovation and technology policies
but all policies that potentially work in favour of transitions.
This paper extends the work on the functions of Technological
Innovation Systems (TIS) by  proposing a novel conceptual frame-
work for policy mixes for sustainability transitions, and introducing
it as “motors of creative destruction” building on and extending
Suurs and Hekkert’s (2009) concept of “motors of innovation”. The
extension addresses a previous critique of the TIS approach (e.g.
Smith and Raven, 2012; Kern, 2015) that  it does not pay enough
attention to the regime level for analysing transitions. While the
idea of destabilising regimes may  be implicit in  TIS through its
intended key contribution to function as a tool for identifying sys-
tem weaknesses preventing a specific TIS from developing (e.g.
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011),  the development of a new TIS does
not  automatically lead to ‘destruction’ in the dominant regime.
Moreover, destabilisation can serve the upscaling of several TISs in
different subsystems, not just a  specific one. Therefore, we  combine
attention to supporting the development of specific niche innova-
tions and new technological innovation systems with attention to
regime destabilisation, and argue that policy mixes need to  attend
to both processes in  a mutually re-enforcing way. Empirical testing
of  the framework is provided by examining policy mixes influenc-
ing low energy transitions in Finland and the UK. Both countries
have made significant efforts to promote energy efficiency but
provide interesting contrasts in several ways (discussed later).
The next section reviews the literature before Section 3 turns to
the proposed analytical framework and the methodology. Section
4 presents the empirical analysis followed by a  discussion of the
key insights in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.
2. Innovation policy mixes and sustainability transitions
2.1.  Policy mixes
Recent interest in  innovation policy mixes has been justified
on the grounds that real world policy contexts involve several
policy instruments in  different policy domains and with differ-
ent rationales, dispersed governance structures and many levels
of administration (Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist, 2013;
Magro and Wilson, 2013; Quitzow, 2015). Many scholars use the
concept of ‘policy mix’ similarly to Borrás and Edquist (2013, p.
1514) who refer to ‘a  set of different and complementary pol-
icy instruments to address the problems identified’ in  a  national
or regional innovation system. However, broader interpretations
have been suggested by Magro and Wilson (2013) and Rogge and
Reichardt (2013),  adding to the mix also policy goals and ratio-
nales as well as processes of policy making and implementation.
While we see merit in the broader concept of the policy mix, for
purposes of empirical illustration in this paper, we focus on what
Rogge and Reichardt (2013) would define as instrument mixes. We
do, however, extend from Borrás and Edquist in  that we  examine
policy mixes for transitions over several policy domains, not merely
‘classic’ innovation policy instruments. Analyses across domains
are important from the perspective of policy coherence and con-
sistency, as sub-optimal or even perverse outcomes of policies can
frequently be  explained by clashing policies designed for different
purposes across different policy domains (e.g. Huttunen et al., 2014;
Nilsson et al., 2012).
Howlett and Rayner (2007) have explained the complexity of
policy mixes developing over time in non-innovation policy con-
texts. They define three kinds of policy mix  evolution: layering that
indicates new goals and instruments added on top of existing ones,
often leading to  incoherent and inconsistent mixes; drift to imply
changed policy goals without altering the instruments, creating
inconsistency between them, and; conversion denoting change in
instruments without altering goals. A fourth type is introduced
by Kern and Howlett (2009) as replacement that fundamentally
restructures both goals and instruments in  a conscious, coherent
and consistent manner. However, Howlett and Rayner (2013, p.
177) note that most existing policy mixes have developed through
“layering, or repeated bouts of policy conversion or policy drift”, often
resulting in  inconsistent policy mixes, and that situations where
new consistent policy mixes are developed are rather rare. Simi-
larly, in the context of innovation studies, Flanagan et al. (2011)
have argued that policy mixes can at best be coordinated by  a  pro-
cess of mutual adjustment between a  variety of actors and systems.
This means that there are no ‘optimal’ (Nauwelaers et al., 2009;
Borrás and Edquist, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) or even ‘good’ (Flanagan
et al., 2011) innovation policy mixes in  a general sense.
Our contribution complements many recent studies on innova-
tion policy mixes (e.g. Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist,
2013; Rogge and Reichardt, 2013)  that are predominantly concep-
tual (the exception being Quitzow, 2015), by applying the concept
of an innovation policy mix to an empirical context. We  also address
other shortcomings in  this literature: the consideration of  inno-
vation fairly narrowly in the context of R&D support, firms and
individual technologies (e.g. Nauwelaers et al., 2009; Rogge and
Reichardt, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) and the lack of attention to pol-
icy mixes fostering ‘directed’ transitions towards more sustainable
socio-technical systems. The need for such transitions is a  cru-
cial policy challenge and an increasing focus of academic research,
reviewed below.
2.2. Sustainability transitions and innovation policy
Considerable recent literature on sustainability transitions has
emerged to study the transformation of socio-technical systems
(incl. technologies, infrastructures, institutions, industrial sectors,
user behaviours) towards environmental sustainability. The multi-
level perspective (MLP) has developed as a  key meso-theory
to  explain such processes (Markard et al., 2012). The principal
idea of the MLP  is that transitions come about through interac-
tions between three different levels: landscape (macro-economic
and macro-political trends, significant environmental changes,
demographic trends, etc.), regime (the deep structure of the
socio-technical system involving alignment between technologies,
infrastructure, institutions, practices, behavioural patterns, mar-
kets, industry structures, etc.), and niches (spaces where various
technical, social and organisational innovations are created and
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tested) (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2011; Geels and Schot, 2007). The MLP
posits that top-down landscape pressures and bottom-up develop-
ments of several emerging niches can lead to  the destabilisation
of incumbent regimes offering opportunities for niches to break
through and overthrow the incumbent regime. Closely connected
to the MLP  (Rip  and Kemp, 1998) and developing at the same
time, the literature on Strategic Niche Management (SNM) has
emerged as a  call to extend technology policy to facilitate the
development of technological niches through experimentation-
oriented policy tools, potentially stimulating transitions towards
new regimes (Kemp et al., 1998; Hoogma et al., 2002). Raven (2005)
has linked niche development and increased niche market size to
the  instability of regimes.
A related theoretical trajectory is that of Technological Inno-
vations Systems (TIS), developed to study the emergence of new
technologies and the formation of technology-specific innovation
systems around them, and particularly to identify “system weak-
nesses that should be tackled by public policy” (Jacobsson and
Bergek, 2011,  p. 46). Many recent TIS studies are  focused on system
functions that are defined as processes influencing the develop-
ment of an innovation system around a particular technology
(Suurs and Hekkert, 2009; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). The central
idea behind the TIS functions approach is  that, through cumula-
tive causation, the different functions strengthen one another and
together lead to  a  positive, self-reinforcing dynamic (‘motors of
innovation’) allowing a  technology-specific innovation system to
develop (Suurs and Hekkert, 2009). Suurs and Hekkert (2009) have
found national policy to  support mainly the ‘science and technol-
ogy push’ motor and to have hampering effects on market and
entrepreneurial motors. The motors are  argued to enable the build-
up of TIS; they emerge over a  long period of time and comprise a
broad variety of activities (Suurs and Hekkert, 2009).
In comparison to MLP/SNM, little insight has been provided on
how an emerging TIS can overturn incumbent regimes, a short-
coming pointed out by Markard and Truffer (2008) and Smith and
Raven (2012). This is because the starting point for (many) TIS anal-
yses is the dynamics of a  specific TIS, while sector or regime level
dynamics are backgrounded. Whereas the identification of techno-
logical innovation system weaknesses is  described as a  core concept
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011), the wider sectoral system or regime
has rarely been explicitly addressed by the empirical TIS studies
published over the last couple of years. More importantly, as the
TIS framework was designed to capture factors (including those at
the sectoral level) that influence the functional pattern of a  specific
TIS, it cannot be expected to identify the full range of sources of iner-
tia that destabilising functions need to address in a  given sector or
regime. Our contribution is, therefore, to extend the TIS framework
to  shed light on the functions needed not  only for the support of
new innovations but also for the destabilisation of existing regimes;
our argument being that  policy mixes need to explicitly attend to
both processes in a mutually re-enforcing way. This complements
the recent papers that discussed innovation policy in  the context
of socio-technical transitions (Alkemade et al., 2011; Weber and
Rohracher, 2012; Meelen and Farla, 2013; Kivimaa and Virkamäki,
2014).
The existing transitions literature acknowledges that gover-
ning sustainability transitions is a political project in which the
direction of travel and the means are often highly contested
(Shove and Walker, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Scrase and Smith,
2009). Different governments engage with the challenges of accel-
erating sustainability transitions in quite different ways (Kern,
2011) and not all policy recipes travel well to  other political
contexts (Heiskanen et al., 2009). Because “[c]hoices among alter-
native technological pathways involve [political] struggles among
rival commercial groups.  . . And politics and governments are
inevitably preoccupied with managing the distributional fall out”
(Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 71), the resulting policy mixes are likely
to  be political compromises. This point about the distributional
effects is  particularly pertinent when discussing policy mixes for
the explicit destabilisation of regimes. While the politics behind
particular policy choices are  an important part of socio-technical
transitions generally, this issue falls outside the core focus of  this
paper as we will argue in  Section 3.
2.3. Policy mixes for creative destruction?
The idea of sustainability transitions as being partly enabled
by the destabilisation of established socio-technical regimes (e.g.
Turnheim and Geels, 2013) links to the concept of creative destruc-
tion, as coined by Joseph Schumpeter. Creative destruction has been
conceptualised as a  process, in which an innovative entrepreneur
challenges incumbent firms and technologies in a  way that makes
the existing technologies obsolete, forcing incumbents to with-
draw from the market (Soete and ter Weel, 1999).  At the heart of
the entrepreneurial action is  disruptive and competence destroy-
ing innovation (Christensen, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986)
that “changes the technology of process or  product in a  way that
imposes requirements that  the existing resources, skills and knowl-
edge satisfy poorly or  not  at all. The effect is thus to  reduce the
value of existing competence, and in  the extreme case, to  ren-
der it obsolete” (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, p. 6). However, critics
also point to  empirical evidence which shows that, through pro-
cesses of creative accumulation, incumbents may be able to absorb
new technologies and integrate them within their existing capabil-
ities and thereby prevent the destruction of existing industries as a
consequence of discontinuous technological change (Bergek et al.,
2013). We  suggest that a similar kind of thinking as implied by  ‘dis-
ruptive innovation’ could be applied to  policy in that policies could
be disruptive in  the institutional context shaking the regime in a
way that reduces the value of existing practices and technologies,
thereby creating momentum for transitions and maybe also incen-
tivising incumbents to play an active role in the transformation.
We  argue that attention to  the destruction side is  particularly rele-
vant when alternative innovations have already developed some
momentum rather than being at a  very early stage. We  further
specify this thinking by developing a  novel analytical framework
in Section 3.1 extending the TIS functions approach.
3. Analytical framework and methodology
3.1. Analytical framework: policy mixes for sustainability
transitions through ‘creative destruction’
Building on the literature reviewed above, the focus of our
analytical framework is  on policy instruments or measures target-
ing two  different types of processes that  have been highlighted
to be  of importance for sustainability transitions: the creation
of niche innovations including their development over time and
the destruction of incumbent regimes (Table 1). On the ‘creative’
side, we mainly use the existing TIS functions as a  basis (Bergek
et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011) as it gives a  rather
comprehensive list  of innovation-inducing processes that policies
can potentially address (Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014), and make
slight amendments influenced by the SNM literature.1 We added
1 Positive externalities has been identified as one of the seven TIS  components,
and may, for example, hinder private R&D investments due to  ‘free’ knowledge spill-
overs to  other actors (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). It is, however, not included
in  our analytical framework as it partly involves public R&D funding, which is  well
covered  in  the categories for knowledge (C1) and resource mobilisation (C5) already.
Second,  Bergek et al. (2008, p.  418) themselves argue that  “[t]his function is  thus
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Table  1
The analytical framework.
Potential innovation/system
influence of policy instrument
Basis in literature Description of policy instruments (influenced by
Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014)
Creative (niche support)
Knowledge creation,
development and
diffusion (C1)
Strengthening the knowledge base and how that
knowledge is developed, combined and diffused is  a key
TIS  function and a key process within the SNM literature
(learning). This implies not only R&D but support for
networks as network weaknesses can hinder knowledge
development (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Different types
of  knowledge, e.g. scientific, technological, production,
market, logistics and design, and sources of knowledge,
e.g. R&D and learning, are included (Bergek et al.,  2008).
R&D  funding schemes, innovation platforms and other
policies aiming to increase knowledge creation and
diffusion through networks; subsidies for
demonstrations; educational policies, training
schemes, coordination of intellectual property rights,
reference guidelines for best available technology.
Establishing market
niches/market formation
(C2)
Strengthening market formation by creating new customer
demand,  e.g. through institutional change, is  also a  TIS
function. It comprises niche markets, e.g. in the form of
demonstration projects, bridging markets and mass
markets (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Also in SNM, niche
markets are considered important for the further
development of new socio-technical configurations
(Hoogma et al., 2002). They can  be created through policy
action but also might pre-exist in the form of green
consumers who buy products with sustainability
credentials despite higher prices or lower performance
(Smith and Raven, 2012).
Regulation, tax exemptions, market-based policy
instruments such as certificate trading, feed-in tariffs,
public procurement, deployment subsidies, labelling.
Price-performance
improvements (C3)
According to  the SNM literature, sustainable innovations
are  often not competitive within normal selection
environments because their performance is  weaker
compared to  incumbent technologies (e.g. electric cars in
terms of range) and/or their price is  higher (e.g. wind
compared to  natural gas) (Schot and Geels, 2008). Through
achieving price-performance improvements, niches can
over  time become competitive with incumbent
technologies and this process can be aided by policy (Kern,
2012). C1  and C2 also influence C3.
Deployment and demonstration subsidies enabling
learning-by-doing; R&D support (cost reductions
through learning).
Entrepreneurial
experimentation (C4)
In TIS, this involves the reduction of uncertainties as a
consequence of the testing of new technologies,
applications and markets to enable piloting, the  creation of
new opportunities and learning (Bergek et al.,  2008;
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). It also involves support for
entrepreneurship, e.g. through innovative policy designs,
addressing partly the formation of new actors and
networks in SNM.
Policies stimulating entrepreneurship and
diversification of existing firms, advice systems for
SMEs, incubators, low-interest company loans, venture
capital; relaxed regulatory conditions for
experimenting.
Resource mobilisation (C5) Mobilisation of human and financial capital, and
complementary assets such as network infrastructure are
included in this TIS  function (Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson
and Bergek, 2011).
Financial: R&D funding, deployment subsidies,
low-interest loans, venture capital.
Human: educational policies, labour-market policies,
secondment of expertise.
Support from powerful
groups/legitimation (C6)
“Legitimacy, i.e.  social acceptance and compliance with
relevant institutions; is needed for many of the other
functions to work, e.g. for resources to be mobilized, for
markets to form and for actors to acquire political
strength. Legitimacy also influences expectations among
managers and, by implication, the function “influence on
the  direction of search”” (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011, p.
51). In SNM, shared positive expectations legitimate the
continuation of protecting and nurturing a  niche (Schot
and  Geels, 2008).
Innovation platforms, foresight exercises, public
procurement and labelling to  create legitimacy for new
technologies, practices and visions.
Influence on the direction
of search (C7)
TIS defines this as incentives and/or pressures for
organisations to enter into the technological field
influenced by  visions and expectations articulated by
companies and in policies (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek,
2011),  by  landscape changes, and by legitimisation (Bergek
et  al.,  2008). Links also the articulation of expectations and
visions  in SNM (e.g. Smith and Raven, 2012). Conflicting
policy goals and instruments are likely to  diminish this
influence.
Goals set and framing in strategies, targeted R&D
funding schemes, regulations, tax incentives, foresight
exercises, voluntary agreements.
Destruction (regime destabilisation)
Control policies (D1) The transition management literature argues that ‘control
policies’ are required to  put pressure on the regime. For
example internalising the environmental costs of carbon
emissions is argued to be key to create an ‘extended level
playing field’ for niches and incumbent technologies to
compete on  fair terms (van den Bergh et al., 2006).  Kemp
and Rotmans argue that without such policies the fostering
of niche innovations will not  lead to  transitions (Kemp and
Rotmans, 2004,  p.  164).
Policies, such as taxes, import restrictions, and
regulations. Control policies, for example, may include
using carbon trading, pollution taxes or road pricing to
put  economic pressure on current regimes. Banning
certain technologies is  the strongest form of regulatory
pressure (e.g. phase out of fluorescent light bulbs).
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Table  1 (Continued )
Potential innovation/system
influence of policy instrument
Basis in literature Description of policy instruments (influenced by
Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014)
Significant changes in
regime rules (D2)
The ‘deep structure’ of socio-technical regimes consists of
semi-coherent set of rules directing and coordinating the
activities of the social groups reproducing the  various
elements of socio-technical systems; one element of
destabilisation can be reconfiguration in the institutional
rules which are favourable to  the  status quo/path
dependent evolution of the regime (Geels, 2011).
Particularly, radical policy reforms, where policies
substantially change economic frame conditions, may
accelerate destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012, p.
44).
Policies constituting, for example, structural reforms in
legislation or significant new overarching laws.
Historic examples of major rule changes include the
privatisation and liberalisation of electricity markets in
the 1990s which completely changed the selection
environment within which utilities were operating.
Reduced support for
dominant regime
technologies (D3)
Support for incumbent technologies can  become
institutionalised within the rules of the regimes which
make it difficult for innovations to break through (Smith
and  Raven, 2012). For example fossil fuel technologies are
heavily subsidised and “their removal would greatly
contribute to their destabilisation”(Turnheim and Geels,
2012, p. 48). Historical examples show that the loss of
support can have serious consequences (Turnheim and
Geels, 2012),  and that radical innovation in technology
implies a changed balance between a process or a product
and  existing resources (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).
Withdrawing support for selected technologies (e.g.
cutting R&D funding, removing subsidies for fossil fuel
production or removing tax deductions for private
motor transport).
Changes in social
networks, replacement
of key actors (D4)
Close relationships between government and key regime
actors  is  often seen as a major source of lock-in (Unruh,
2000; Walker, 2000). Regime destabilisation may  involve
replacement of incumbents by  new actors (Turnheim and
Geels, 2012). Similarly creative destruction involves
replacing existing skill and knowledge (of  actors) with new
ones (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Deliberately breaking
up established actor-network structures or developing
different fora to  bypass traditional policy networks could
provide windows of opportunity for niche innovations and
is one of the  strategies recommended by transition
management scholars (Rotmans et al., 2001).
Balancing involvement of incumbents for example in
policy advisory councils with niche actors (as
attempted in the Dutch energy transition programme
through the transition platforms) (Kern and Smith,
2008); formation of new organisations or networks to
take on  tasks linked to  system change.
‘price-performance improvements’ as an additional category,
because the SNM literature argues that price-performance
improvements are an important process that helps stabilise a  niche
and enables it to  compete with incumbent technologies (Geels and
Schot, 2007).
Our analytical categories on the ‘destruction’ side are developed
drawing particularly on the concepts of regime (e.g. Hoogma et al.,
2002; Geels, 2010) and destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012,
2013). We also link these to creative destruction and disruptive
innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) and some of the ideas of
transition management (Rotmans et al., 2001; Kemp and Rotmans,
2004).
What do we  know about how existing regimes can be unsettled?
Technological regimes have been conceptualised to be about rules,
i.e. the cognitive and normative framework connected to functional
relationships between technical components and actors (Hoogma
et  al., 2002, p. 19). It is both the technology and the rules in  the
regimes that have  frequently been identified to be path dependent
and, therefore, difficult to change (Unruh, 2000; Pierson, 2004).
The struggle between niches (creation and development of the
new) and regimes (stability of the old ‘dominant design’ (Anderson
and Tushman, 1990)2 supported by  incremental innovation (c.f.
not independent but works through strengthening the other six  functions”, which
is  why  we focus on  the other six functions.
2 The concept of ‘dominant design’ originated in the literature on technology
cycles, in which has been  predominantly used in an industry context rather than
in  the context of (broader) socio-technical regimes. In this literature, technological
discontinuities trigger a  period of ferment –  characterised by ‘substantial rivalry
between  alternative technological regimes’ – that ends in the emergence of a
new dominant design; one example being the internal combustion engine used
in  powering automobiles. The dominant design is  argued to lead a period of incre-
mental improvements and incorporate a  technological regime that is  more orderly.
Abernathy and Clark, 1985)) has been argued to happen around
dimensions such as markets, regulations and infrastructure, and the
politics around them, and being enacted by various actors building
coalitions, when navigating transitions (Geels, 2010; Meadowcroft,
2011).
In  the literature linked to  creative destruction, the struggle has
been described to  occur particularly after disruptive innovation
has emerged. The struggle is portrayed as competition between
old and new technical regimes during the ‘era of ferment’ which
happens until a  new dominant design has emerged from competi-
tion between actors (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). The selection
of the new dominant design in  turn leads to and is supported by
the build-up of standards and optimised organisational processes
around it (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Thus, the concept of
regimes implies rules, technologies and actor-networks as the main
components that can enforce stability or, when they change, create
instability of the regime. Therefore, we propose our regime desta-
bilising functions to  be linked to changes in  rules, technologies and
actor networks (drawing on Kern, 2012, and Verbong and Geels,
2007).
In  our analytical framework (Table 1), rules are divided into two
functions: control policies implying efforts to control the environ-
mental impacts of the existing regime (D1) and significant changes
in  regime rules referring to structural reforms in legislation and sig-
nificant new overarching laws that are not necessarily directly or
solely targeting environmental impacts (D2). The transition man-
agement literature has long argued that ‘control policies’ (D1), one
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). We connect to  these concepts here because, they
not only build on  the idea of creative destruction, but according to Anderson and
Tushman (1990, p.  606) the dominant design “technology could be examined at
several levels of analysis”.
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example being the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, are required to
put  pressure on the regime. For  example, internalising the envi-
ronmental costs of carbon emissions is  claimed to  be crucial in
creating an ‘extended level playing field’ for niches and incumbent
technologies to compete on fair terms (van den Bergh et al., 2006).
Kemp and Rotmans (2004) argue that without such policies the
fostering of niche innovations will not lead to transitions. There is
indeed much evidence to  suggest that both niche support policies
and policies to internalise externalities are required and that nei-
ther of them is a good substitute for the other, see e.g. Newell (2010)
and Popp (2006). However, a  relatively high carbon tax would to
some extent enable lower deployment subsidies to be effective than
would otherwise be the case.
In addition to internalising externalities, it has been suggested
that transitions require significant changes to  regime rules (D2)
in ways favourable to niches, because existing rules normally hin-
der path-breaking innovations (Smith and Raven, 2012). Turnheim
and Geels (2012, 2013) argue that, as part  of regime destabil-
isation, the ‘weakening reproduction of core regime elements’
is seen as necessary to  create ‘windows of opportunity’ for the
upscaling of niche innovations. Particularly, radical policy reforms,
where policies substantially change economic frame conditions,
may  accelerate destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012). Such
examples are the UK electricity market reform which gave prior-
ity to low carbon electricity generation options (Kern et al., 2014)
and the coal market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s showing that
“industries can be deliberately destabilised” (Turnheim and Geels,
2012, p. 48).
In terms of changes in technologies, creative destruction
through disruptive innovation involves processes by which
resources, skills and knowledge held by incumbents become obso-
lete; in an industrial context, implying that, for example, the value
of existing expertise and other factors of production reduce signif-
icantly (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). This is a  rare event (Anderson
and Tushman, 1990) as support for incumbent technologies is often
institutionalised within the rules of the regimes making it difficult
for innovations to break through (Smith and Raven, 2012; Turnheim
and Geels, 2012). Historical evidence shows that destabilisation
normally entails weakening flows of resources into the reproduc-
tion of regime elements including core technologies (Turnheim
and Geels, 2013). For example fossil fuel technologies are  heavily
subsidised and “their removal would greatly contribute to their
destabilisation” (Turnheim and Geels, 2012,  p. 48). Thus, policy
mixes for destabilisation may  involve weakening flows of human
and financial resources to established technologies and practices
in the form of withdrawn subsidies or the shut-down of education
programmes for engineers focused on particular technologies (D3).
For example, in Germany, as part of the phase-out of nuclear power,
federal research funding has been withdrawn from nuclear fission
research.
A core process within transitions is  the entry of new play-
ers challenging established regime practices. People able to think
‘outside the box’ can make important contributions to radical
innovation (Bower and Christensen, 1995)  and policy processes
(Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015). The interests that these ‘out-
siders’ have in existing systems tend to differ from the vested
interests of incumbent actors, who carry more ‘sunk costs’ and
are consequently more tied to perpetuating the existing way of
doing things. Close relationships between the government and
incumbent regime actors are often seen as a major source of lock-
in (Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000). New entrants are more likely to
develop radical innovations which, if successful, can disrupt and
displace the mainstream way of doing things (e.g. Christensen,
1997). Destabilisation at the level of actor-networks may  therefore
involve the replacement of incumbents with new entrants or the
reorientation of  incumbents to new regimes (Turnheim and Geels,
Fig. 1. Focus of analysis.
2012,  p. 35). Deliberately breaking up established actor-network
structures or developing different fora to  bypass traditional policy
networks is one of the strategies recommended by transition man-
agement scholars (e.g. Rotmans et al., 2001). From this we deduct
that previously dominant governance organisations or networks
may  be dismantled, replaced with new networks, merged or other-
wise altered, decreasing the legitimacy of and commitment to the
old regime (D4). An example is the Dutch energy transition pro-
gramme  which by setting up transition platforms explicitly tried to
bypass ‘normal’ policy making processes (Kern  and Smith, 2008).
Alternatively, the setting up of systemic intermediaries (Kivimaa,
2014)  could be  regarded as an action aiming to change social
networks.
Overall, the proposed framework seeks to capture what we
see as two sides of the same coin: the creation and development
of innovations (C-functions) and the destruction of incumbent
regimes (D-functions). This analytical framework will be used to
empirically map  policy instruments to  assess whether existing pol-
icy mixes have the potential to drive sustainability transitions. The
logic is to ascribe each instrument to contributing to  one or more of
these ‘creative destruction’ processes to  reveal whether or  not the
existing policy mix  addresses the stipulated functions (C1–7 and
D1–4).
There is a  close relationship between policy processes (including
their politics, the institutional contexts in which they are embed-
ded, etc.) and the resulting policy mixes, and their outcomes (Fig. 1).
The policy studies literature has much to say about the former (1)
and innovation economists have spent much time analysing the
latter (3).  The focus of our analysis is  on the overall characteristics
of the policy mix  (2). Policy design scholars argue that while it is
important to evaluate ex-post the impacts of policy instruments,
we can also assess ex-ante the likely outcome of policy mixes by
focussing on design criteria for effective policy mixes (Howlett and
Rayner, 2007, 2013). Howlett and Rayner (2013, p. 171) suggest that
policy mixes, if designed appropriately, can be expected “to have a
higher probability of delivering a  specific outcome than some other
configuration”. Coherence is  often stipulated as one such design
criteria. Some studies have empirically looked at the coherence of
policy mixes for sustainability transitions (Kern  and Howlett, 2009;
Huttunen et al., 2014). Building on this literature and the work on
transitions more widely, we suggest that policy mixes aimed at
stimulating transitions, in addition to  general criteria such as coher-
ence, need to  include elements of ‘creative destruction’ (Table 1) to
have better chances to  succeed. Our framework is therefore hoped
to  provide ex ante guidance to  policy makers on more effective
policy mixes for achieving transitions.
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3.2. Methodology
The empirical illustration of the utility of the framework focuses
on  national-level policies including national implementation of EU
legislation. Even though local or  regional initiatives also influence
transition processes (e.g. Hodson and Marvin, 2010, 2012), they
are beyond the scope of this paper.3 Our analysis is  limited to
three regimes – mobility, electricity and heating of buildings –
which cut across policy domains such as innovation, energy, fis-
cal and transport policy in  two different countries: Finland and the
UK. We  look for mixes of policies supporting transition processes
and, thus, define policy mixes, extending from Borrás and Edquist
(2013) as the specific combinations of policy instruments which
interact explicitly or  implicitly in fostering (in our  illustration,
low-energy) innovations and disrupting dominant (high-energy)
regimes.4 We examine instruments influencing innovation related
to energy demand reduction and improved energy efficiency; thus,
for  example renewable energy policies focussing merely on the
supply side (e.g. wind power, biofuels) are outside the scope of our
analysis.
The research method used is a  policy mapping exercise. By
using four international data sources of policy measures, to enable
the collection of comparable data for both countries, lists of rele-
vant policies potentially influencing low energy transitions were
identified in September and October 2013. The following sources
were used: The International Energy Agency’s reviews of energy
policies in the UK (IEA, 2012)  and Finland (IEA, 2013) and the
IEA policies and measures databases on energy efficiency (http://
www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/), the European Environmen-
tal Agency’s database on climate change mitigation policies and
measures in Europe (www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/pam/),
the European Commission’s Erawatch research and innovation pol-
icy database (http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/
) and the IEA Sustainable Buildings Centre’s Building Energy Effi-
ciency Policies (BEEP) database (www.sustainablebuildingscentre.
org/pages/beep).5 Information on the identified policy instruments
was complemented by searches made on both countries’ govern-
mental websites to find out the objectives, justifications and main
content of the policy instruments, and complement the analyses to
identify new organisations and networks. The draft lists of policy
instruments were sent to four experts from policy and academia in
each country, of which two replied per country, to validate the list
and to check possible major omissions. We initially identified 70
instruments in the UK and 58 in  Finland and added seven Finnish
instruments and three UK instruments through the expert review
process.
The identified policy instruments were divided into groups
based on their target regime: mobility, heating in buildings and
electricity. Many policy instruments contributed across these sec-
tors and were categorised as generic innovation policy or energy
and climate policy instruments. The instruments that linked across
sectors were also often instruments that did not only deal with
energy efficiency but also energy supply – making drawing explicit
boundaries between energy efficiency and other energy policy
instruments difficult. Subsequently the policy instruments were
coded in Excel based on the analytical framework categories.
Investigator triangulation was used in  that both authors coded
3 The existing databases used for the analysis unfortunately only cover national
level instruments.
4 While in terms of empirical illustration, we focus on instrument mixes, we  see
the usability of our proposed framework also in examining in more detail mixes
of  policy goals, instruments, and processes and how they in combination influence
transitions. However, such a wider analysis is  beyond the scope of this paper.
5 No  equivalent database exists for transport policies but the other sources cover
many transport-related policies.
independently, after which the results were compared. In case of
differing opinions, the final coding was  negotiated between the
authors to  ensure consistency.
The aim of the mapping exercise was to analyse how current
policy mixes engage or do not  engage with processes argued to be
crucial for low energy transitions. Particular consideration was paid
to  the relative attention these policy mixes placed on creation vs.
destruction, the relative coverage of the different regimes in terms
of number of instruments, and any important gaps. The purpose
here was  to  look at how existing policy mixes fill in all the functions.
While we  do demonstrate the number of instruments per function,
we  want to emphasise that the influence of instruments in each
function is more relevant than the number of instruments. Yet a
low number of instruments in  a given function can be used as an
indication of an area were further analysis of influence placed by
policies on  the function is needed.
3.3. Empirical cases: low-energy transitions policy in Finland and
the UK
Empirically, the analysis focuses on low-energy innovations
which we define as innovations reducing the demand for energy
and/or increasing energy efficiency. Such innovations include more
energy efficient technologies, such as LED lighting or  new building
designs, but they might also include social (e.g. car clubs, tele-
working) or organisational (e.g. new business models providing
energy services) innovations. Our focus complements the existing
literature on energy innovation which mostly deals with energy
supply (e.g. Foxon et al., 2005; Klaassen et al., 2005). Practices
for energy saving and demand have gained some interest recently
(Breukers et al., 2013; Heiskanen et al., 2013), while this is  a  new
topic for innovation policy analysis.
Finland and the UK were chosen as case countries as their recent
progress in energy efficiency shows differing trends based on an EU
wide survey. While the UK was found to have a clear strategy for
improving energy efficiency, policy progress in the last three years
was ranked from low to moderate; in  turn, Finland was ranked
among the top three countries in terms of progress in  energy effi-
ciency policy (Energy Efficiency Watch, 2013). The countries also
differ in terms of their energy use profiles, the UK having one of
the lowest energy use per GDP among the IEA countries (IEA, 2012)
while Finland has one of the highest (IEA, 2013). In Finland, indus-
try is the largest energy user with nearly half of the total, while in
the UK buildings take up the majority of energy use. Furthermore,
the countries differ radically in terms of population size and den-
sity. Thus, the two  countries provide contrasting settings for testing
the conceptual framework. In Section 4,  the empirical mapping
is briefly presented, first, giving an overview and, then, covering
destabilising functions in more detail as this is  where we  claim the
added value of our framework.
4. Low energy policy mixes in Finland and the UK
4.1. The low-energy policy mix in Finland
With one third of the country being located above the Arctic
circle and given its energy intensive industry (incl. pulp and paper,
chemicals, metals, electronics) Finland has the highest energy use
per capita of all IEA countries (IEA, 2013). The industrial sector is
the largest energy user (47.5% of total final use), followed by the
residential sector (20%), while the commercial and other service
sectors accounted for 15.3% in 2011. Transport accounted only for
17.2%; the lowest percentage among IEA member countries. The
Finnish building stock is  very efficient and makes extensive use of
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Fig. 2. Finland’s ‘low energy’ policy mix.
district heating, 75% of which is provided by combined heat and
power plants.
Our analysis of the Finnish policy mix shows a wide range
of instruments targeted at different energy regimes that in
combination influence all niche supporting and regime desta-
bilising functions. However, very few instruments address
price-performance improvements (C3) and the destabilising func-
tions (Fig. 2). A multitude of policy instruments influencing
mobility and the heating of buildings are in  force, while electricity
use is somewhat less targeted.
A gap in the policy mix  exists for transport, heating of buildings
and electricity regimes regarding ‘entrepreneurial experimenta-
tion’ (C4), which is  left to be addressed by generic innovation and
climate and energy policies (such as Finnvera’s financial services
for start-ups and micro-enterprises and energy efficiency guide-
lines for public procurement).6 For example, the energy aid scheme
provides subsidies on a  discretionary basis on investment projects
that “promote energy conservation or improve the efficiency of
energy production or  use”. This policy coupled with electricity tax
increases (linked to  market formation C2, influence on the direction
of search C7, control policies D1) and energy performance require-
ments for new buildings (contributing to market formation C2,
price-performance improvements C3, direction of search C7, and
control policies D1) could at the same time destabilise the existing
regime, contribute to a transition towards zero energy buildings
and create niche-innovations for energy saving solutions in  con-
struction. Yet, there is no guarantee that resources in connection to
generic innovation support will actually be allocated for the pur-
pose of supporting energy demand reduction or efficiency.
In total we found nine control policies (D1), one significant
change in regime rules (D2), four policies representing the removal
of support for dominant technologies (D3), and one change in actor-
networks (D4). The regime-specific control policies ranged from
environmental amendments in tax regimes (for vehicles, transport
fuels, electricity, natural gas and heating) to performance stan-
dards and regulations for new cars and buildings. Three of the D1
policies concerned mobility, four concerned electricity and heat-
ing, and two were more generic climate policies, such as the EU
6 A previous study on mobility-related policies noted a  lack of significant national-
level  instruments related to  ‘entrepreneurial experimentation’ (C4) and ‘market
formation’ (C2) (Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014).
Emissions Trading Scheme. For  example, the National Building Code
sets requirements for the energy use of Finland’s building stock
in  accordance with the EU Directive on the Energy Performance
of Buildings. The 2012 revision pushes Finland’s already stringent
energy performance requirements up  by a further 30%, and now
also takes into account the energy source of the building.
We interpreted a  recent revision in the Land Use and Building
Act, influencing energy use across regimes, as a  significant change
in regime rules (D2). The revised Act aims to ensure energy effi-
ciency and resource efficiency in  the renovation of buildings and to
avoid disruptive land use development and increased transporta-
tion needs specifically by limiting the construction of retail centres
based on  private car transportation. Its  significance is based on the
expansion of support for energy efficiency through the Act and the
strengthening of the instruments of the law (for  example, by pro-
viding mandates to  municipalities to make obligations linked to
reduced energy use).
Amendment of the fuel tax to be based on the energy content
of the fuel and an increased tax level for fossil fuel based heating
were considered as removal of support for dominant technologies
(D3) as was the EU wide ban on incandescent light bulbs. Fuel tax
in general reduces support for high-energy consuming vehicles and
practices and, when taking into account the energy content of the
fuel, this effect is intensified to  support the most efficient fuels. At
the same time, the attempts to significantly reduce the tax break
for work-based travel, increasing transport energy use, have failed
due to  political difficulties.
No significant changes in  policy networks or  key actors (D4)
were identified in policy instrument databases but the other
sources revealed a  potential new destabilising actor in the energy
regime. Inspired by a  group of distinguished professors publishing a
report on the need for new energy policy, an action focused network
was established based on open engagement with a variety of actors
from associations to a  range of small and larger companies. The net-
work aimed to lift energy policy as one of the most important goals
for the new government resulting from spring 2015 elections and
bring resource use as its focus.
Overall, the Finnish policy mix  demonstrates an imbalance
between creation and destabilisation policies, not  only as numbers
of instruments, but also in  terms of content, particularly linking to
significant changes in  regime rules and changes in  official policy
networks and actors. The large number of policies influencing the
low energy field in  general may, in  turn, create increased likelihood
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Fig. 3. UK ‘low energy’ policy mix.
for inconsistencies due to the layering of policies. More attention is
needed on how the multiple policies crossing regimes and domains
influence transitions.
4.2. The low-energy policy mix in the UK
The  largest end-use of energy in the UK occurs in the residential
sector, amounting to  32% of total final use, followed by  transport
with 30%, industry with 25% and commercial and other sectors with
13% in 2010. According to  the IEA (2012, p. 13), “[e]nergy use per
unit of GDP in the United Kingdom is one of the lowest among the
IEA member countries, reflecting both the large share of services
and the small share of energy-intensive industry in the economy,
but also improvements in energy efficiency”.
Our analysis of the UK policy mix  shows a  wide range of instru-
ments targeted at different energy regimes that in  combination
influence all niche supporting functions and regime destabilising
functions (Fig. 3). However, as in  the Finnish case, very few instru-
ments address price-performance improvements (C3) and the
destabilising functions (D1–4). A multitude of policy instruments
influencing mobility and the heating of buildings are in  force, while
electricity use on its own is  somewhat less targeted. However, sev-
eral instruments address electricity and heating simultaneously.
The UK has recently introduced several policy instruments influ-
encing energy efficiency and energy demand in the heating of
buildings and mobility. Both sectors present fairly comprehensive
policy mixes from the perspective of niche support with only legit-
imising instruments (C6) missing for mobility. However, many of
the mobility policies (at  least at the national level) focus specifically
on automobility (such as car tax reforms, programmes for electric
mobility, fuel economy labels, the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership)
rather than alternative mobility systems (cycling, walking, public
transport) (see Supplementary data). Many of such initiatives are
happening at the city or local level (e.g. congestion charging in  Lon-
don, city bike schemes, car clubs).7 Less focus in  terms of energy
efficiency measures has been placed on  the electricity sector that
is dominated by supply side instruments trying to  stimulate the
uptake of renewable energy technologies, nuclear and CCS.
7 Expert review comment.
As in the Finnish case, a gap in  the policy mixes for the heating of
buildings and electricity regimes exists regarding ‘entrepreneurial
experimentation’ (C4), which is mainly left to be addressed by
generic innovation and climate and energy policies (with the
exception of the Carbon Trust which fosters ‘entrepreneurial exper-
imentation’ (C4) for example through an incubation scheme for low
carbon businesses).
Similarly to Finland, few policy instruments were found to con-
tribute to the destabilisation of existing regimes (D1–4). In total,
we identified 16 instruments as ‘control policies’ (D1), one signif-
icant change in  regime rules (D2), one policy removing support
for established technologies (D3) and one new actor (D4). As in
Finland, control policies included minimum performance standards
for new passenger cars and buildings, changes in taxation (e.g. com-
pany car tax reform, fuel duty escalator) and the Emissions Trading
Scheme. In addition, the UK had a  range of policy instruments and
packages – differing from Finland – as further control policies: a
requirement of private landlords to make reasonable energy effi-
ciency improvements required by tenants, the Climate Change Levy
on energy for lighting, heating and power aimed at encouraging
energy efficiency in  businesses, the Carbon Price Floor as part  of
the electricity market reform, and the Government Buying Stan-
dards. All these instruments put economic or regulatory pressure
on existing regime practices. For example, the Carbon Price Floor,
by ensuring a  minimum price of carbon, aims to reduce the use of
carbon intensive fossil fuels and to address the weakness of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme.
Our UK analysis identified one policy instrument deemed to
directly address significant changes in regime rules (D2): the 2008
Climate Change Act. The act aims for a  50% reduction in green-
house gas emissions from 1990 to  2027 and a  reduction of  80%
by 2050. According to  the Act, a  system of “carbon budgets” limits
UK emissions over successive five-year periods and sets the tra-
jectory to  2050. Most emphasis has so far been put on change
within the electricity regime (e.g. with regard to the roll-out of
low carbon generation) but the recent electricity market reform
introduces a number of instruments putting pressure on fossil fuel
plant operators. The reform mainly deals with energy supply rather
than energy use or energy-efficiency but, for example, capacity pay-
ments have been introduced to ensure sufficient system flexibility
to maintain reliable supplies, and will also involve demand-side
response issues.
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The only instrument we  identified as being directly targeted
at withdrawing support for a  dominant regime technology (D3)
was the EU ban of incandescent light bulbs introduced in  2012.
The EU ban aimed to increase the energy efficiency of lighting and
sent a strong signal to manufacturers and consumers by  using the
most draconian policy measure available: an outright ban. This is
the most extreme form of withdrawing support for a  technology
which has been dominating domestic lighting practices for more
than a century. Potentially such an instrument, in  combination with
other instruments such as the national products policy (legislation
to set minimum energy efficiency standards for products on sale
and mandating energy efficiency labelling of appliances), also has
a signalling effect for manufacturers of other highly-energy ineffi-
cient products.
The Climate Change Committee (CCC) set up to oversee the exe-
cution of the Climate Change Act represents a  change in key actors
(D4). The CCC independently advises the governments on the car-
bon budgets required to meet the long term targets enshrined in
the act, advises on policy actions to reduce emissions, and measures
progress against the targets. As such the CCC has become an influ-
ential body within UK energy and climate policy and there have
been several instances of conflicts (e.g. around the fourth carbon
budget) between the government and the advice of the CCC but so
far the CCC has prevailed.
Overall, as in the Finnish case, there is an imbalance between
creative and destructive policies, but there is a  slightly larger focus
in the UK on destabilising policies than in Finland (a wider range
of control policies being used). Especially, the Carbon Price Floor is
principally able to contribute to  the destabilisation of high energy
regimes, but much depends on its future setting (e.g. planned
increases were recently frozen). Significant policy attention has
been devoted to low energy innovation in  the UK, and several new
policy instruments were added to the existing mix, which suggests
an increased likelihood for inconsistencies because of layering of
policies. The government is  aware of this challenge and has com-
missioned a report (Opportunities for integrating demand side energy
policies) which concluded that there is a wide range of government
programmes supporting energy efficiency and distributed energy
solutions but that a lack of integration could cause policies to  com-
pete or undermine each other’s effectiveness.
5. Discussion
The empirical analysis showed that the framework developed
in this paper – combining seven niche support (creative) func-
tions with four regime destabilising (destruction) functions –  can
reveal interesting lessons about policy mixes for sustainability tran-
sitions. We  suggest that policy mixes which cover both dimensions
of ‘creative destruction’ are more likely to  achieve transitions. Inter-
estingly, both countries show largely similar policy mix  profiles
(demonstrated in Figs. 2 and 3), while the mix  of UK policies for
‘destruction’ appears more innovative and extensive.
As expected we found fewer policy instruments directly tack-
ling regime destabilisation (D-functions) than niche support
(C-functions). Relatively many control policies (D1) were found
in both countries that simultaneously also influenced market for-
mation (C2) and/or the direction of search (C7). Some UK D1
instruments also influenced knowledge creation and diffusion (C1)
and resource mobilisation (C5).
We found two examples of significant changes in  regime rules
(D2): the revision of the Land Use and Building Act in Finland
and the Climate Change Act in the UK. The rarity of this function
can probably be explained by the political hostility towards struc-
tural change and the difficulties to  politically sustain it (Lockwood,
2013).
We identified only a  few changes in support for dominant tech-
nologies (D3) directly applicable to  the reduction of energy demand
or improvement of energy efficiency, such as the EU-wide ban on
incandescent light bulbs and the amendment of transport fuel tax-
ation in  Finland. However, indirectly, the removal of support for
fossil fuels is  a measure destabilising the high-energy regime and
has clear implications: reduced support for fossil fuel exploration
and production may  increase energy prices and, thereby, increase
incentives for low energy innovations. In the UK, several such meas-
ures have been taken, for example, the removal of subsidies for coal
mine operating costs, in 2002, and for maintaining access to  already
exploited coal reserves in  2008 (IEA, 2012, p. 93). What the exam-
ples of selected destabilising policies may  also indicate is  that not
so many destabilising policies may  be necessary, as long as they
exist in a form able to disrupt the regime.
Destabilisation policies are politically difficult. That we  find
few examples of such policies is therefore not surprising. In  a
general sense the development of energy policy mixes in both
countries probably represent what Howlett and Rayner (2007)
would classify as layering, while destabilising policies–particularly
those addressing reduced support for dominant regime technolo-
gies, replacement of key actors, or significant changes in rules
would require a replacement (Kern and Howlett, 2009) approach.
Jänicke and Jacob (2005) have argued that necessary structural
change from an environmental perspective, such as the phasing
out of nuclear energy or the use of lignite coal, requires huge
political endeavour and is  therefore possible only in exceptional
circumstances. Also Meadowcroft (2005, 2011) has made a  simi-
lar point. Moreover, designing policies attempting to undermine
existing regimes is challenging, because they present a  contradic-
tory ideology to that of traditional innovation policies, often aimed
to contribute to  economic growth (e.g. Alkemade et al., 2011), and
because they are  likely to require significant backing of major polit-
ical parties (e.g. Strunz, 2014).
However, there are a  number of arguments policymakers can
use to justify destructive policies: one is  that destabilising existing
regimes is one way of achieving more effective competition (in  the
sense of ‘levelling the playing field’). A second justification might
be that  such policies are required to free Keynes’s ‘animal spirits’
necessary for radical entrepreneurship and its effects in terms of
‘creative destruction’. Yet  even in the event of political backing for
restructuring policy mixes in  a given domain, such as energy or
innovation, the creation of new policy designs requires a  sophisti-
cated analysis of policy dynamics and instrument choice (Howlett
and Rayner, 2007), while still facing the risk of sub-optimal policy
mixes (Kern and Howlett, 2009) particularly when confronted with
policy instruments designed for completely different purposes.
Our empirics also point to connections within policy mixes.
Whereas the discussion on the synergies and contradictions (cf.
Nilsson et al., 2012; Rogge and Reichardt, 2013)  or cumulative cau-
sation (cf. Suurs and Hekkert, 2009)  between the elements of  this
framework cannot be addressed here in detail, some observations
on the links between creative and destructive policies can be made.
Control policies (D1) have a clear dual function in  destabilising the
current regime, often by controlling the environmental impacts,
while at the same time supporting niche development through cre-
ating markets for niche innovations (C2), in effect contributing to
multiple “motors” (see Section 2.2)  at the same time. The EU Direc-
tives on Emissions Trading or the Energy Performance Standards
for buildings are good examples.
Less directly, knowledge creation, development and diffusion
(C1) and resource mobilisation (C5) might be linked to the removal
of support for established technologies (D3) in that re-directing
research funding, education and science to certain areas simulta-
neously may  promote niches and withdraw support from estab-
lished technologies. This means that a mix  of policy instruments
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could both contribute to the Science and Technology Push (STP)
motor of a new TIS and diminish the STP  motor of the dominant
regime simultaneously. In that sense it seems useful to expand the
concept of ‘motors of innovation’ to ‘motors of creative destruc-
tion’. We argue that while the cumulative build-up of various
innovation system functions (here covered through the niche sup-
port functions) is necessary, on its own it is insufficient to  drive
significant sustainability transitions, especially given the urgency
of the required transitions. Therefore, the cumulative effects and
dynamics of both niche support and regime destruction processes
should be at the centre of attention. Further analysis of these links
– particularly those linking significant changes in  regime rules (D2)
and changes in networks and replacement of key actors (D4) with
impacts on niche support functions (C1–7) – would need more
detailed case studies with a  more limited scope of policies than
analysed in this paper.
Our empirical analysis also points to  a need for further concep-
tual and methodological developments. The placing of instruments
into functions was sometimes difficult and more specific indicators
for each function are needed – particularly on how to interpret the
functions ‘legitimation’ and ‘price-performance improvements’.
This further definition of functions is necessary to analyse the
effects of policy mixes but is likely to require further empirical
studies on destabilising policies and how their effects unfold to
provide insights into the actual content and nature of destabilising
functions and the resulting new governance arrangements.
Often policy instruments can be interpreted to  be contribut-
ing to specific functions or  not  depending on how narrow or wide
the interpretation of the function is. For example, in  terms of
resource mobilisation (C5) a  policy instrument can directly provide
resources (e.g. by setting up a  public fund for R&D on energy effi-
ciency) or indirectly stimulate the mobilisation of resources by
other actors (e.g. by  setting vehicle emission standards leading to
stronger R&D efforts by  car manufacturers or by establishing a  pres-
tigious energy efficiency award which might stimulate investment
by private actors). This is not only a  problem of classification but
also influences the potential effect of policies. Interpreting func-
tions in a narrow way enables better identification of potential
policy gaps to be analysed in more detail when observed.
6. Conclusions
Our aim was to broaden the discussion within the technology
and innovation studies literature about the importance of policy
mixes. We  argued that policy mixes are particularly important
and challenging, if policy is aimed not just at the creation or dif-
fusion of innovations but at transforming entire socio-technical
systems towards sustainability. Drawing on the existing policy mix
and sustainability transitions literatures, the contribution of this
paper was to explicitly conceptualise policy mixes for sustainability
transitions. Our key argument was that policy mixes for sustaina-
bility transitions should incorporate instruments addressing two
dimensions: those aimed at creating niche-innovations and build-
ing effective innovation systems around them, and those aimed
at destabilising currently dominant regimes creating openings for
a speedier take-off and sustained growth of niche innovations to
replace incumbent (high energy) technologies. We therefore pro-
pose to expand to  concept of ‘motors of innovation’ to ‘motors of
creative destruction’ to incorporate attention to  the required desta-
bilisation processes of incumbent regimes.
We specifically built on the Technological Innovation System
(TIS) functions and Strategic Niche Management for developing
niche support functions, while for the destabilisation functions we
utilised Schumpeter’s seminal concept of ‘creative destruction’, the
concept of regime destabilisation by Turnheim and Geels (2012,
2013) and some ideas of transition management (Rotmans et al.,
2001). By initiating a  discussion on policies destabilising current
regimes, we  wish to facilitate further analyses of policy mixes going
beyond stimulating individual technologies as in  much of the exist-
ing TIS literature.
We  argue that  the conceptual framework and the analy-
sis  presented in  this paper are a first step towards examining
policy mixes from the perspective of sustainability transitions.
Empirically, we  have provided an overview of which pro-
cesses are targeted by existing policy mixes in  the UK and
Finnish low-energy transitions and have identified some impor-
tant gaps, particularly the lack of destabilising policies generally
as well as sector- and technology specific policies addressing
price-performance improvements and entrepreneurial experimen-
tation. Given these gaps in the current policy mix  designs,
more attention should be placed by policymakers on whether
the current policy mixes are sufficient to achieve the ambi-
tious long-term targets for energy efficiency and energy demand
reduction. Conceptually, we have developed an extension of
the TIS functions approach, by adding four regime destabilisa-
tion functions (D1: control policies, D2: significant changes in
regime rules, D3: reduction in support for dominant technolo-
gies, and D4:  changes in social networks and replacement of key
actors), and tested the framework against two case studies which
emphasised the need for further conceptual and methodological
refinements.
Admittedly, the approach presented in the paper is a very proxy
way of analysing policy mixes and necessarily quite crude. One
shortcoming of the kind of analysis conducted here is that, while
we  see a  variety of instruments aimed at energy demand reduc-
tion, little can be said about their actual effectiveness. A more
detailed analysis of a  limited set of instruments, their develop-
ment over time and their impact on the strategies of target groups
should be conducted to build on and complement our overview. In
more detailed analyses, interviews with target group actors could
shed light on how  actors interpret the signals they receive from
different policy instruments (cf. Huttunen et al., 2014) and how
this shapes their strategies. Alternatively, econometric techniques
could be used to assess the combined impact of policy mixes. While
these kinds of studies have been carried out, so far they have  not
extended to examining the impacts from the perspective of  creative
destruction for sustainability transitions.
We  argue that the type of analysis carried out in  this paper is
also of use for policymakers. Importantly, it shows that the mix of
generic innovation policies and targeted sectoral (and technology-
specific) policies is important to  create more complete policy
mixes from the perspective of transitions – following Weber and
Rohracher’s (2012) call for a  combination of ‘structural innovation
policies’ and ‘transformation-oriented innovation policies’. Apply-
ing the concept of ‘creative destruction’ in the context of  public
policy will hopefully help to expand innovation policy debates to
go beyond policy mixes consisting of technology push and demand
pull instruments, and to  consider a  wider range of policy instru-
ments which may  contribute to  both  the creation and development
of niches as well the destabilisation of existing regimes.
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